Landing

Summary/Lessons Observed

Operation Logistics

- is an ENABLING function for the success of CAMPAIGNS/MAJOR OPS

- It defines the LOGISTICAL FOCUS OF EFFORT in order to overcome DEFICIENCIES

o During this period there was a great deal of infighting between the Services, yet Gen MacArthur appreciated the advantage of each Service’s strength.

 Navy to land the forces

 1st marine Division to conduct the initial assault

 Followed by the 7th Infantry Division which captured Seoul in order to properly outpost and protect the city.

 Navy/Marine Corps initially provided Tactical air support until Kimpo AB was established for the Air Force.

POSITIVE ***in today’s logistics, the efforts of joint, combined, and host nation is integrated to support our COCOMs. We cannot win wars alone, we need all the services and our allies.****

Simplicity

- It enables EFFECTIVENESS in EXECUTION in which ensures that the LOGISTICAL FOCUS OF EFFORT is correctly defined

o There are two objectives during the campaign: 1. Landing in the enemy’s rear and advancing 25 miles to Seoul, 2. Then offload Logistical forces in a concentrated area rather than dispersed which is controversial in MacArthur’s plan. However, he’s intention was to bring in the LSTs during the high tide and ground them as the tide went out. The plan was too risky yet effective.

POSITIVE****how do we compare that in the current AF, for the most part, all members of the logistical force know and understand the commander’s intent. Knowing and securing our personnel and equipment is critical for continuous logistics flow. Just like we have seen in the past week were we build bridges, fund roads…it looks like we are investing it for the local nat’l but in the end, we have our own intention why we do such effort***

Logistical Plan and Decisions

- Must be based on ENEMY CAPABILITIES rather than INTENTIONS

o Knowing your enemy’s capabilities convey the limit of options. In the case of MacArthur, he knew Inchon was not heavily fortified so the option of reinforcement was out of the enemy’s range of option. Also, since Inchon was the closest port to Seoul, the planned shortness of operation meant it required the least logistics infrastructure preparation. In three days; 53,882 personnel and 6,629 vehicles were ashore.

POSITIVE***So what’s the number one mode of transportation we use in the military? Historically, the critical proximity of the sea in any future operation

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