The Moral Right

In "A Right to do Wrong," Jeremy Waldron argues that an individual has the moral right to do something even if it is morally wrong. He believes that this type of liberty that a person is entitled to is protected even though the statement seems paradoxical. Although the individual is not purposefully trying to commit a wrongful act, there is no boundary for their actions as long as they have the right to do it. In this essay, I will oppose Waldron's view by evaluating what is meant by the term "right" and explain if this view really exists.

Before any argument can be proposed about whether such a right really exists, it is imperative to understand Waldron's terminology of the word "right". A noun of a right can be put into statements by saying, "you have a right to join the National Front" as opposed to an adjective of a right which utters, "you are right to join the National Front." (1) Waldron admits that both statements about rights offer consequences to a person's conduct. This means that a morally right act is "one that will produce a good outcome, or consequence." (2) A person is typically held responsible for their actions and should make the appropriate judgment before proceeding with them. Furthermore, Waldron describes the adjective of a right as an "antonym of a wrong" and the word "rightness" can be easily replaced by "claims or entitlements". (3) However, in a philosophical perspective, it is necessary to realize that words cannot simply be replaced and that we are dealing with the complexity of the word "right."

When analyzing the nature of rights, it seems plausible to refer to the Hohfeldian analytical system. Waldron rejects this system completely but before I provide reasons on why he is wrong, I will present the different normative elements to clarify the significance behind them. The system entails the following: the privilege, the claim, the power and the immunity. Each of these terms has a "distinctive logical form and the incidents fit in characteristic ways to

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create complex 'molecular' rights." (4) Privileges are rights in which an individual has "no duty not to do." (5) For example, a person might paint the walls in his own bedroom in order for it to look more masculine. It can also be understood as permission if an individual is granted the privilege to perform an action. A claim is a duty in which an individual has an obligation to do. For example, a police officer has a duty to protect and serve the community. A power is when a person has an authority based on a given set of rules to introduce, change or alter the rules already in place. It can also be connected to H.L.A Hart's proposal of primary and secondary rules. Conversely, a person has an immunity if he/she has no authority within a given set of rules to introduce, change or alter the rules already in place.

Now that the Hohfeldian elements have been explained, I will connect this to Waldron's main argument that there is a moral right to do a moral wrong. Waldron suggests that, "duty, wrongness, and permissibility are -though relative to rights- not confined to the area of rights." (6) This weak claim misguides the reader since it tells a person that it is morally sound to perform a morally wrong action. If a person has an obligation or a duty not to do something, then it should be logical that he does not do it. It does not matter how he/she was brought up or what their habits are, with every choice there comes a responsibility and if a wrongful act interferes with the rights of others, it should not be permissible. Waldron follows up this argument by suggesting that, "there are no conceptions of normative constraints on action other than duties." (7) However, a person always has a duty not to violate any rules set out by the legal officials on, for instance, not harming others or invading someone's private property without permission. If a person would be acting on what is morally right without duty, then there would surely be chaos in this world.

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The verdict of a prima facie duty and an actual duty is also a critical point of my analysis on Waldron's argument. Although he gives his take on another misguidedly claim, at the very end he concludes by saying that, "it seems then that the distinction between prima facie and actual moral requirements, tailored as it is to the analysis of cases in which moral reasons for acting conflict, is inappropriate for analysis of the tensions that arise in the case of our paradox of a right to do wrong." (8) This statement contradicts his main argument since he is critiquing his thoughts by genuinely saying that they are wrong. Waldron explains that sometimes our moral duty to perform an action will come into conflict with other moral duties along the

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