The Suspension of the Ethical and the Religious Meaning of Ethics in Kierkegaard's Thought

In the article, "The Suspension of the Ethical and the Religious Meaning of Ethics in Kierkegaard's Thought," Avi Sagi describes the relationship between morality and religion. Sagi, then, brings up his view in different 'approaches'. The question of whether morality and religion are dependent of each other is the main focus of this article. Avi Sagi believes that morality and religion are independent of each other, and something is not moral because it is religious. For me, I agree with Avi Sagi in some ways, but also disagree with him in other aspects of his article. In Sagi's words, this occurs when a religious duty is contradictory to a moral duty. This can be shown throughout the story of Abraham in the Book of Genesis of the Bible.

Sagi opens his article with his view and the way that he will attack this issue, that issue being the relation between morality and religion. In one approach, Sagi plans to describe religion and its dependency on morality or morality and its dependency on religion. He then breaks this approach into two sub-approaches. These smaller approaches further describe two different ways in which this approach is proven. After providing a detailed explanation of this view, Sagi displayed a different approach in which morality and religion are two independent subjects and have no relation. Sagi also makes two different ways of describing this approach. During the whole of this article, Sagi describes both views and remains unbiased until he gets to his argument. He also uses the story of Abraham to support and contradict both approaches in different ways. Most of Sagi's points originate through "Fear and Trembling" by Kierkegaard.

Sagi's first approach is that morality and religion are dependent of each other. In this view, God's command can be morally justified. In the story of the Bible, Abraham's command from God was to sacrifice his son, Isaac. By this approach, because God told Abraham to sacrifice his son, it is moral. This approach can be broken into two of what Sagi named versions. These two versions differ in the way that they are morally justified.

The first version of this approach states that "God's command is justifiable in terms of ordinary, human moral considerations."(Sagi, pg. 84). In the context of the primary source, Abraham follows the command to sacrifice his son, Isaac, because God told him to. Also, Abraham went through with the sacrifice because he felt like his son would not have to be sacrificed. The article goes in to mention that one's actions can be defined as moral if they are under command of a good god. Because God was a 'good god,' he deserves faithfulness from Abraham.

With this version in mind, Abraham would be immoral if he were to refuse sacrificing his son, Isaac. This makes sense, but how can a good god be distinguished from a bad god? If Hades was considered a bad god and ordered Abraham to sacrifice his son, it would be moral not to kill his son. I know this instance would never occur, but this is what I thought of when the article mentions good and bad gods. This does not make sense to me. Just because a god is good or bad should not determine whether or not one would choose to worship them.

It just so happens that God is a 'good god,' and Abraham acts in the way he does, basically, because he believes in God and wants to please him. This can also be considered piety in Socrates' view presented in Plato's "The Last Days of Socrates." Socrates states that one pleases the gods because they are pious. Kierkegaard agrees with Socrates when Sagi writes, "Kierkegaard hence chooses horn (b) [did God command x because it was it is moral], which assumes that morality is intrinsically valid and independent of God and, for this reason, the good God will command it."(Sagi, pg. 93/4). In the case of Abraham, he sacrifices his son because it is pious, and it would have pleased God. This would have made sense to Socrates if he had read it, but Euthyphro would have disagreed. Euthyphro believed the horn a of Kierkegaard's view that stated that Abraham's action was pious because God commanded it. In this aspect, I would have to disagree with Socrates. If God commanded it because it was pious, or moral, then he is suggesting that murder is an acceptable action. This version of the first approach mentioned also contradicts Kierkegaard's view that he presents in "Fear and Trembling." Sagi writes, interpreting Kierkegaard, that Abraham is acting upon his judgement and worship of God, and morality plays no role in his actions.

The second version of this first approach is stated by J. Donnelly, who further interpreted Kierkegaard's thought. Donnelly states, "one ought to obey the mandates of God in all situations, however demanding."(Sagi, pg. 86). By this, it is one's moral duty to obey God and all of his commands no matter how outrageous or unethical. This version could describe why Abraham decided to sacrifice his son. Abraham, basically, has to do what he has to do in order to satisfy himself. Abraham would not have been satisfied with himself unless he followed God and all of his commands, therefore, deciding to sacrifice his son.

This version also makes sense, but also has its flaws. I do not, personally, agree with this version or approach. If I was in Abraham's position, I would not have sacrificed my son just because a higher being told me to. In the Book of Genesis it is written, "God tested Abraham. He said to him, "Abraham!" And he said, "Here I am." He said, "Take your son, your only Isaac, whom you love, and go to the land of Moriah, and offer him there as a burnt offering on one of the mountains that I shall show you.""(Genesis, 22.1-22.2). Following this passage is Abraham going to the mountain with Isaac, unaware that he is to be sacrificed. In these two verses, God just tells Abraham to sacrifice his son. There is no consequence presented

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